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Evidence 
by Ronan E. Degnan* 
A pleasant Chinese custom is to designate each year with 
a name; the Western year 1968 is the Year of the Monkey. 
In the parlance of lawyers concerned with the law of evi-
dence, 1967 was the Year of the Statute. The truly momen-
tous event was January 1, the effective date of the Evidence 
Code. Some other statutory developments of lesser but still 
substantial significance have also occurred. 
This survey is concerned with case law as well as with 
statutes, but the cases selected will be of primary interest 
because they shed some light on how California courts are 
apt to interpret the statutes. Somewhat paradoxically, this 
requires some preference for dictum over holding. The clear 
holdings from all but the very end of the calendar year were 
applications of the old law, because the appellate courts were 
still disposing of the cases that had gone to trial before 
* B.S.L. 1950, LL.B. 1951, University ber, Iowa, Minnesota and Utah State 
of Minnesota. Professor of Law, Uni- Bars. 
versity of California, Berkeley. Mem-
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January 1, 1967. But the appellate judges were alert to the 
new Code, and frequently they would consider how they 
might be required to rule if the new rather than the old law 
applied. These utterances may be dicta only, but they are 
more interesting than a most carefully considered decision 
that was obsolete the very day on which it was decided. 
Not until the very end of the year did any number of 
cases actually tried under the Evidence Code come before 
the courts for reported decision, and these are noted when 
they seem to be significant. In a fair number of cases courts 
have noted, somewhat in surprise, that the new law is not 
different from the old. In nine out of ten instances, this is 
the case; most of the Code merely codifies the rule as it existed 
before. 
Legislative Developments of 1967 
Chapter 650 of the Session Laws made some technical 
changes in certain sections of the Evidence Code itself. The 
changes are narrow in scope, largely confirmatory in nature, 
and of only occasional interest to the general practitioner. 
Another legislative change is found in Chapter 262, which 
conforms the terminology of the Agriculture Code on pre-
sumptions and prima facie evidence to the scheme of the 
Evidence Code. l While some of these changes may prove 
to have significance in the future, their general purpose was 
not to amend the existing law but to correct the form of 
stating it. For that reason they are only mentioned. 
Quite another type of change was worked by Chapter 
1509. It collects some previous sections scattered at random 
through the Penal Code, amends those sections, adds some 
entirely new provisions, and assembles thereby a wholly new 
chapter of the Penal Code. This chapter is numbered 1.5 
and is entitled Invasion of Privacy. Although found in the 
Penal Code, it has an important impact upon both civil and 
criminal trials, and its effect will be felt in office practice 
as well as in court. It therefore warrants some description. 
1. See Levy, Commercial Transac-
tions in this volume, for similar amend-
ments to the Commercial Code. 
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The preamble2 recites that technology has created new 
devices for the purpose of "eavesdropping upon private com-
munications" and that the resulting "invasion of privacy" has 
"created a serious threat to the free exercise of personalliber-
ties. ." New section 631 is former Penal Code section 
640,3 but with significant change; it now provides that any-
one who makes an unauthorized connection with a telephone 
wire, or who, without the consent of "all parties to the com-
munication," attempts to learn of the contents of a telephonic 
communication in that manner, or who uses any information 
so obtained, is guilty of a felony. Section 632 is a consolida-
tion of former Penal Code sections 653(h)4 and (j);5 it now 
provides that any person who uses electronic devices to 
eavesdrop on or record a "confidential communication" with-
out the consent of all of the parties to it is similarly guilty 
of a felony. But note, this confidential communication is 
not the kind of privileged confidential communication defined 
and protected in the Evidence Code.6 The term is separately 
defined in the Penal Code and covers "any communication 
2. Cal. Pen. Code § 630. 
3. Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 571, § 1 p. 
1070. 
4. Cal. Stats 1941, ch. 525, § 1 p. 
1833. 
5. Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1886, § 1 p. 
3871. 
6. Cal. Evid. Code § 917 does not de-
fine confidential communication but 
does establish a presumption that any 
communication made in the course of 
the lawyer-client, physician-patient, psy-
chotherapist-patient, clergyman-penitent 
or husband-wife relationship is confi-
dential. Individual privileges may con-
tain special provisions to define what is 
meant by the confidential relationship 
and the communications made within it. 
See, e.g., Cal. Evid. Code § 952 (confi-
dential communication between client 
and lawyer). 
The rules of privileged communica-
tion prevent the person who heard the 
privilege from revealing it in court, and 
he is exempted from the pressure of con-
tempt to reveal the confidence. Noth-
ing in the new Invasion of Privacy chap-
ter being discussed places any party to 
a conversation, no matter how confiden-
tial others expect it to be, under a re-
quirement of silence, nor is there any-
thing in the chapter which exempts the 
parties from compulsion to reveal the 
content of the "confidence" when sub-
jected to subpoena. 
Obviously, both laws could apply to 
a single conversation. A lawyer who 
secretly records an interview with a cli-
ent is subject to Evidence Code restric-
tions on revealing it and probably vio-
lated the Penal Code chapter by record-
ing it. § 636 also makes a felony of 
any electronic eavesdropping or record-
ing of conversations between a person 
in police custody and his attorney, reli-
gious adviser or physician, if it be done 
without the consent of ''all parties to the 
conversation. " 
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carried on in such circumstances as may reasonably indicate 
that any party to such communication desires it to be confined 
to such parties. ."7 (emphasis added) 
In addition to the felony sanctions found in the two sections 
summarized, a whole battery of remedies is made available. 
No evidence obtained "as a result of eavesdropping shall be 
admissible in any kind of proceeding, judicial, administrative 
or legislative."8 Civil remedies are also created; an injured 
person (it is not clear that the claimant need be one of the 
parties to the conversation, although it does seem that only 
one of those could suffer a violation of confidence) may seek 
an injunction9 and can recover a minimum damage award 
of at least $3,000 without proof that any actual damages have 
been suffered or threatened.10 And actual damages, if proved, 
are to be trebled.ll 
The potential impact of these new sections on the enforce-
ment of the criminal law is controlled by two major exceptions. 
One allows a party to a confidential communication who 
reasonably believes that another party thereto will make utter-
ances "believed to relate to the commission by another party 
to such communication" of certain named offenses-extortion, 
kidnaping, bribery, any felony involving violence against the 
person, or the making of obscene or threatening telephone 
calls-to record that communication.12 Evidence so obtained 
7. Cal. Pen. Code § 63Z(c). 
8. Cal. Pen. Code § 63Z(d). 
9. Cal. Pen. Code § 637.Z(b). 
10. Cal. Pen. Code § 637.Z(a)(1). 
11. Cal. Pen. Code § 637.Z(a)(Z). 
12. Cal. Pen. Code § 633.5. The 
wording of this section presents a num-
ber of problems. If one of the parties 
to the conversation reasonably antici-
pates that another party to it will dis-
close evidence relating to one of the 
named crimes, the making of a re-
cording is not prohibited. This seems 
enough to protect the person who re-
cords but does not obtain the reasonably 
expected evidence of crime; he is not 
guilty of a felony. It seems probable 
262 CAL LAW 1967 
that the intent of the draftsmen was 
only to give that protection, and to make 
any other use of an innocent conversa-
tion, or one that discloses civil liability 
rather than a crime, or that discloses a 
crime other than one of those named, 
a violation subject at least to the non-
criminal sanctions of exclusion from 
evidence. This suspicion seems con-
firmed by the language expressly admit-
ting the evidence recorded in those pros-
ecutions. But since the exclusion-from-
evidence sanctions exclude only evidence 
obtained in violation of the basic sec-
tions, it would seem that none of the 
sanctions is applicable because record-
ing on reasonable belief that the named 
crimes will be disclosed is not prohib-
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(evidently either the tape itself or leads provided by it) is 
expressly made admissible in prosecutions for those named 
crimes. But since the making of such a recording is expressly 
excepted from the basic criminal sections themselves, there 
seems to be no reason why the evidence would not be admis-
sible in any other judicial proceeding as well, nor should there 
be any civil remedy or recovery because there has been no 
violation of the prohibitory sections themselves. 
The other major exception is a savings clause for police. 
Nothing in the basic prohibitory sections themselves shall 
prohibit any prosecuting attorney, member of the Highway 
Patrol, sheriff or deputy regularly employed and paid, or 
policeman, or any person acting at the authorized direction 
of one of those named, from overhearing or recording any 
communication they could lawfully have heard or recorded 
prior to the effective date of the act.I3 And the preamble, 
reciting a recognition of the needs of law enforcement to 
employ such devices in fighting crime, declares an intention 
not to place "greater restraints on the use of listening devices 
and techniques by law enforcement agencies than existed" 
prior to the act. I4 
The major change, apart from the elaborate and awesome 
penalty structure created, is found in the clearly deliberate 
change from the rule that anyone party to a communication 
made by wire or otherwise, could record or authorize the 
recording or electronic eavesdropping on that conversation. 
Under the amended law, no party can record or authorize 
ited. If the purpose was to exempt 
from felony sanctions recording on rea-
sonable belief, but to allow use of the 
tape only if the named crimes were dis-
closed and prosecution followed, it is un-
likely that this result has been achieved. 
Even that result would not be with-
out problems. People v Stanley, 67 
Cal.2d 837, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825, 433 P.2d 
913 (1967), was a prosecution for sod-
omy. An investigator retained by the 
defendant interviewed a principal wit-
ness, one of the victims. According to 
the offer of prool, that conversation dis-
closed an agreement between the witness 
and another person "to get" the defend-
ant; the conversation had been taped. 
If the taping was without consent of 
the witness, and if it disclosed a scheme 
amounting to extortion, would it never-
theless be inadmissible because the pros-
ecution was not for one of the named 
crimes but for something else? If it dis-
closed an agreement "to get" that fell 
short of extortion, would the tape be in-
admissible? 
13. Cal. Pen. Code § 633. 
14. Cal. Pen. Code § 630. 
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electronic eavesdropping on a communication that any other 
party to it reasonably believes to be confidential. 
The old law was clear enough. Prior section 653 (j)I5 
allowed "any party" to consent to amplified eavesdropping 
by third persons. An obvious proposition was that either 
party could secretly record. The same result obtained in 
wiretapping cases under old section 64016 because of the 
construction given the language in People v. Malotte: 17 "There 
is no learning of the contents of a communication 'fraudu-
lently, clandestinely, or in any other unauthorized manner' 
when one of the participants to the conversation consents 
to or directs its overhearing or preservation." The result 
of the Malotte case may still be the law after the statute 
because of the preservation of the right of the police to engage 
in activity that was permitted them before the amendment. 
But the reasoning of Malotte is no longer valid, since it is no 
longer possible for one of the participants in a conversation 
to authorize other persons to electronically eavesdrop on or 
record a "confidential conversation." The rule of Malotte 
protected any eavesdropper with consent; the statute now 
protects only eavesdropping police. 
Another development in the field of privacy during 1967 
came from another source but so overlaps with the California 
legislative enactment discussed above that the two must be 
joined for discussion. In Katz v. United States/8 federal 
agents had attached a recording device to the outside of a 
public telephone booth. They overheard and recorded what 
Katz said to confederates in Miami and in Boston, and then 
used his words to convict him of transmitting wagering infor-
mation over a wire communication facility in interstate com-
merce, a federal felony. The agents were scrupulous to hear 
and record only what Katz said, and thus they avoided viola-
tion of the Federal Communications Act prohibition against 
intercepting and divulging the telephonic communication 
itself. They thought that they had also avoided violation 
15. Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1886, § 1 p. 17. 46 Cal.2d at 64, 292 P.2d at 520 
3871. (1956). 
16. Cal. Stats. 1955, ch. 571, § 1 p. 18. - U.S. -, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 
1070. S.Ct. 507 (1967). 
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of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable 
search and seizure. The Supreme Court held that they had 
not-words as well as things can be seized. Overruling 
Olmstead v. United States,!9 the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people, not places, and thus the absence 
of a common-law trespass (either because the agents did not 
penetrate the booth itself, or because it was a public booth, 
which they as well as Katz lawfully could enter) did not 
matter. 
The extent of the overlap between the federal development 
discussed here and the California legislation should not be 
minimized by the fact that a telephone booth was involved. 
It was the entering of the enclosure, which was reasonably 
thought to be private and free from intrusion, that brought 
the Fourth Amendment into play. Had Katz and his con-
federate crowded into the booth and exchanged their infor-
mation orally, but without use of the telephone at all they 
would equally have been entitled to be free from electronic 
or even unaided eavesdropping.20 
In civil cases, the potential of the statutory development 
reaches at least some aspects of law office operation. Many 
a telephone conversation is routinely recorded without ex-
plicit warning to the other party that a recorder is operating. 
Investigators, and even clients themselves, are instructed to 
record conversations with potential witnesses, often without 
giving any warning and sometimes with active concealment 
of that fact. A not unusual practice in divorce cases is to 
have one spouse induce the other to make admissions of 
matters such as infidelity under express or implied assurances 
of confidence. 
All of these practices are now at least suspect and dan-
gerous. While it seems still to be the law that any party to 
a conversation, telephonic or not, may testify to what he and 
others said unless the contents are made privileged by the 
19. 277 u.s. 438, 72 L.Ed. 944, 48 relegated to the companion article on 
S.Ct. 564, 66 A.L.R. 376 (1928). criminal law and criminal procedure. 
20. The refinement of the impact of The same is true of the Fourth Amend-
this particular piece of 1967 legislation ment developments of the Katz case. 
on enforcement of the criminal law is 
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Evidence Code, no person is entitled to bolster his credibility 
as a witness by producing a clandestine tape that confirms 
his version. A witness may still be impeached by the show-
ing of prior inconsistent statements made, or a party con-
fronted with his previous admissions, even if he was unaware 
that he was being overheard at the time he made the state-
ment. But the making of the statement cannot be proved 
by a clandestine tape recording, or recounted orally by one 
who overheard it through the use of amplifying devices, 
whether or not it was simultaneously recorded. 
The very employment of the recording or amplifying device 
is what is dangerous. The sanction is not merely that the 
recorded words will be refused admission. The person who 
offers the prohibited recording is guilty of a felony, as is the 
person who made it. If the prosecutor proves to be uninter-
ested in the offense, the civil action for a minimum damage 
award of $3,000 is a threat within the control of the private 
party without prosecutorial aid. 
It would seem that a minimum precaution to be taken by 
those who make such recordings would be an announcement 
heard on the tape itself that the conversation is being re-
corded, with some acknowledgment of that fact by the other 
party or parties thereto.! On the other side, a cross-examiner 
confronted with oral testimony about a conversation had 
between the witness and others might well inquire whether 
the conversation had been recorded. 
A word of conjecture about the future of the Invasion 
of Privacy chapter may be in order. No doubt the draftsmen 
intended to achieve a significant change in the law. Whether 
their full hopes will be realized may be doubted, however; 
the combination of very vague and ambiguous drafting with 
1. On this point as well, the new leg-
islation is very vague. § 632(c), defin-
ing confidential communications, em-
phasizes the desire of any party to the 
communication that it be confidential. 
Mere knowledge that it is being re-
corded does not necessarily refute the 
266 CAL LAW 1967 
desire for confidentiality. But § 632 
(b), defining those persons who may be 
guilty of violating, specifically "excludes 
an individual known by all parties to a 
confidential communication to be over-
hearing or recording such communica-
tion." 
8
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/12
Evidence 
a system of most extreme penalties available at the instigation 
of any person who thinks himself wronged will in all prob-
ability lead to judicial constructions confining the impact of 
the legislation to the narrowest and clearest violations. 
The Evidence Code Itself 
As indicated, the legislative changes in the Evidence Code 
worked by the 1967 legislature are of a static nature. Some 
part of them may ultimately prove to be of significance, but 
that is not now predictable. More important is what hap-
pened during the year in early judicial anticipation of the 
Code and of later application of its terms. 
Effective Date 
Section 12 of the Code provides that it shall become opera-
tive on January 1, 1967, and shall govern proceedings in 
actions brought on or after that date. Predictably, the chal-
lenge has already been raised that making the new rules 
of admissibility, more liberal than existed when the offense 
occurred, applicable to a crime committed before the effective 
date is a violation of provisions against retroactivity when 
used against a defendant. 
It might be thought that this will be a burning problem for 
a short time under the Code but will decline quickly because 
cases of older vintage will soon disappear. This is doubtless 
true of civil actions. But as to them, the claim of uncon-
stitutionally retrospective application seems too frail to war-
rant serious consideration. It is as to criminal cases, and 
the proscription against ex post facto legislation, that the 
contention is serious. And it arises not merely in the carry-
over of calendars pending at the end of 1966. Criminal 
convictions are more often reversed for new trials than are 
civil judgments. Further, the availability of habeas corpus 
and other modes of collateral attack make probable the hold-
ing of a new criminal trial not merely a few months after 
the effective date of the Code but also long after, for crimes 
committed years before that date. 
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People v. lohnson2 is such a case. Defendant had been 
convicted of incest. The exact time sequence is not revealed 
in the opinion, but the grand jury indictment was returned 
in February 1964. The ensuing conviction was vacated by 
a United States District Court in July 1966. The new trial 
in the state court commenced on January 24, 1967, and the 
trial judge applied the Code. The result was an admission 
of hearsay evidence that would not have been admissible if 
the trial had commenced a month before, and that could 
not have been received at the time of the alleged offense (J an-
uary 1964) or at any prompt trial time thereafter. 
The case presents the issue in very stark form. As will 
be demonstrated in discussion of the substantive hearsay ques-
tion of this case, no conviction could have resulted without 
the evidence newly made admissible by the Code. An advised 
verdict of acquittal would have been mandatory. 
The case was well briefed and carefully decided, and it 
resulted in a sustaining of the conviction over the ex post facto 
objection. Obviously the last word lies with a higher court, 
possibly with the Supreme Court of the United States. 
The defendant urged, and the court of appeal primarily con-
sidered cases decided in that court. Prime among them was 
Calder v. Bull,3 and the quoted language, although dictum, 
seems applicable; ex post facto laws include "every law that 
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or dif-
ferent, testimony than the law required at the time of the 
commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender." 
But subsequent decisions have indicated that the essential 
protection of the ex post facto clause is against imparting 
criminality to conduct not criminal when it was engaged in, 
or increasing the punishment for what was then a lesser of-
fense. It does not preclude reception of evidence from a 
source that was statutorily kept silent at the time of the 
conduct now charged. If a witness not competent to testify 
at the time of the charged conduct can be made competent 
by subsequent legislation, as the Supreme Court in Hopt 
2. 257 Cal. App.2d 655, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3. 3 U.S. (3 DaIl.) at 390, 1 L.Ed. at 
875 (1967), hearing in California Su- 650 (1798). 
preme Court granted February 21, 1968. 
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v. Utah,4 it would seem even more clear that the previously 
inadmissible hearsay of a witness can be given the effect 
of substantive evidence of guilt rather than for mere impeach-
ment. The opinion in People v. Johnson so holds, by rejecting 
the ex post facto objection. 
The court of appeal did not consider a somewhat related 
constitutional objection, which is that the reception of hearsay 
may violate the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal accused 
to confront the witnesses against him. This is a ground not 
connected with the effective date of the Evidence Code, and 
it may invalidate the use of hearsay that was admissible under 
the old law, as well as some made newly admissible by the 
Evidence Code. It seems sufficient to note that in Johnson, 
unlike the situation presented by Douglas v. Alabama,5 the 
accused did have opportunity at trial to examine the witnesses 
upon the content of their prior testimony before the grand 
jury. The opinion does not indicate that he made any effort 
to do so, and hence there was no showing that the witnesses 
might have invoked a privilege or otherwise refused to answer 
when questioned about their own prior statements, as they 
did in Douglas. At worst, one of the witnesses in Johnson 
testified that she could not recall the events described in one 
of the prior statements attributed to her. This was on direct 
examination; had she made the same disclaimer on cross-
examination, a more tenable claim of ineffective opportunity 
to cross-examine, and hence a denial of the right to confront, 
would have been presented. 
The record in Johnson thus did not directly present a con-
frontation claim. Cases still developing under the Code will 
raise that question and call for a decision. An attorney 
should be alert to the possibility that any of the hearsay 
4. 110 U.S. 574, 28 L.Ed. 262, 4 S. 
Ct. 202 (1884). 
5. 380 u.s. 415, l3 L.Ed.2d 934, 85 
S.Ct. 1074 (1965). The witness, alleg-
edly with the accused when the crime 
was committed, invoked the privilege 
against self-incrimination and gave no 
testimony. Under the guise of impeach-
ment, the prosecutor read the prior writ-
ten statement of the witness, sentence by 
sentence, to the witness in front of the 
jury. When asked if he had made each 
of the statements, the witness again in-
voked the privilege. Since the witness 
had given no testimony, and refused 
to answer questions, cross-examination 
seemed futile. 
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exceptions that were newly created or substantially enlarged 
by the Evidence Code contain the potential for violation of 
the confrontation right if they effectively limit the opportunity 
for cross-examination. What was lacking in Johnson was a 
demonstration by questioning that cross-examination was 
rendered impossible or ineffective. 
Witnesses 
The Code purports to work a number of changes, most of 
them minor, in the rules regulating examination and cross-
examination of witnesses. The most prominent of the cases 
decided on the point is People v. Stanley.6 The defendant 
was charged with sodomy committed with two young boys, 
one 10 years old and another 14. The 10-year-old gave 
very precise testimony about the occasion charged and other 
occasions not charged, and about offenses committed both 
with himself and with other boys. Because of grave doubts 
about this testimony, the supreme court found ground for 
reversal under the pre-1967 law. Reversal was based largely 
upon the "other crimes" evidence, and represents nothing 
new. 
More important is the fact that the trial judge had com-
pounded that error by refusing to hear even an offer of proof 
to the effect that an investigator retained by defendant had 
interviewed the 14-year-old and obtained statements to the 
effect that the two boys had made an agreement "to get" the 
defendant. Because the judge refused to hear the offer on 
the ground that it was hearsay, the precise content of the 
conversation was not revealed. The supreme court held that 
it would be admissible for the purpose of impeachment on 
retrial. 
The prosecution did not dismiss the counts relating to the 
14-year-old, but neither did it offer him as a witness. Defend-
ant's motion to dismiss charges as to this boy were denied, 
but the court did dismiss the boy as a prosecution witness. 
This left it to defendant to decide whether to call the boy 
6. 67 Cal.2d 837, 63 Cal. Rptr. 825, 
433 P.2d 913 (1967). 
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to the stand. The trial judge indicated that calling him would 
amount to an adoption by the defendant of the boy's testi-
mony, under the time-honored rule that calling the boy made 
him "your own witness." Defendant did call the boy, daring 
to ask only two questions, and the prosecutor did not cross-
examine. 
All of the new law of this case is found in a footnote,7 
which is more important for the future than the longer opinion 
stated in the text. The Code abolishes8 the rule applied by 
the trial judge which bound the party to the testimony of 
his own witness, or which at least prevented impeachment by 
the party calling the witness unless both surprise and damage 
could be shown. Thus the trial judge, although right at the 
time of trial, would be in error if he were to rule the same 
way at the new trial. 
There are two questions the court did not expressly consider 
in this significant footnote. First, the tape recording might 
be an independently inadmissible item because of the Penal 
Code sections treated above, depending of course upon the 
conditions under which it was made and the time at which 
it was made. Second, the court did not consider the inde-
pendent evidence effect of the prior statement of the 14-year-
old under the enlarged hearsay exceptions of the new Code. 
The first of these problems has already been discussed. The 
second seems next in order here. 
Hearsay Enlargements 
The Stanley case displays the operative effect of making 
prior statements of a witness an exception to the hearsay 
rule rather than merely impeaching testimony. Continuing 
the prior law, the Code defines as hearsay any statement 
"made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing 
and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated."9 
Under that definition, the investigator's testimony about what 
the 14-year-old disclosed about the agreement "to get" the 
7. 67 Cal.2d at 841 n. 1, 63 Cal. Rptr. supported by any party including the 
at 827 n. 1, 433 P.2d at 913 n. 1. party calling him." 
8. Cal. Evid. Code § 785: "The cred- 9. Cal. Evid. Code § 1200(a). 
ibility of a witness may be attacked or 
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defendant would indeed be hearsay. Under the old law, it 
would be admissible only to impeach the 14-year-old's testi-
mony-if he gave any. It would not be evidence of such 
an agreement, and above all it would not discredit the very 
explicit and precise testimony of the 10-year-old. The 
jury would be instructed accordingly, and defense counsel 
would not use the testimony of the investigator for any pur-
pose other than to discredit the 14-year-old. 
The Code result, although not discussed in the opinion, 
would be very different. There would have to be compliance 
with section 770.10 That is, the 14-year-old would have to be 
confronted with his alleged prior inconsistent statement and 
given opportunity to explain it, or at least he should not be 
excused from further attendance before the investigator testi-
fied. Given that assurance of opportunity to cross-examine 
the boy, the prior statements could be shown if they were 
"inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing. 
,,11 Given inconsistency, not shown in the record in 
Stanley because the prosecutor asked no questions of the 
boy and the defendant dared not ask any under the law 
governing at that time, the prior statement would be admis-
sible as substantive evidence despite its hearsay character. 
It would be evidence of an agreement "to get" the defendant, 
made not merely by the 14-year-old but also by the 10-year-
old, whose destructive evidence had already been received. 
It may be argued that the only practical change is in the 
admissibility of the evidence of prior statement. The jury 
(or even a judge without a jury) probably would not limit 
the prior statement to impeachment but would consider the 
10. Cal. Evid. Code § 770: "Evi-
dence of inconsistent statement of wit-
ness. Unless the interests of justice 
otherwise require, extrinsic evidence of 
a statement made by a witness that is 
inconsistent with any part of his testi-
mony at the hearing shall be excluded 
unless: 
(a) The witness was so examined 
while testifying as to give him an op-
portunity to explain or to deny the state-
ment; or 
l72 CAL LAW 1~1l7 
(b) The witness has not been excused 
from giving further testimony in the ac-
tion." 
11. Cal. Evid. Code § 1235: "Evi-
dence of a statement made by a witness 
is not made inadmissible by the hearsay 
rule if the statement is inconsistent with 
his testimony at the hearing and is of-
fered in compliance with Section 770." 
14
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/12
Evidence 
full substantive significance of the proved agreement, not 
merely to discredit the 14-year-old but to disbelieve the 
10-year-old as well. Perhaps so, although there is always 
the possibility that a jury will at least attempt to follow 
instructions. Speculations about the judge are less tenable, 
for in this case he refused even to hear what the investigator 
would say because of its hearsay character. Even if judges 
and jurors will often ignore the law, there is still significance 
to the change from mere impeachment to substantive evi-
dence. The judge must hear the evidence; he can no longer 
instruct the jury that it is only impeachment and not evidence. 
Above all, counsel can now argue to the jury that they should 
believe the prior story, not merely that they should refuse 
to credit the sworn but inconsistent tale told on the witness 
stand. 
Even those who scoff at all these changes as being merely 
formal rather than real can hardly ignore what happens 
when the circumstances are reversed and the hearsay favors 
the prosecution rather than the accused. Section 1235 was 
also involved in People v. lohnson,12 mentioned above. John-
son was charged by grand jury indictment with incest with 
his teen-aged daughter. At the 1967 trial, both the daughter 
and the mother gave testimony that, at very worst, indicated 
astonishing familiarity between father and daughter but which 
could not sustain a finding of intercourse; the daughter denied 
it had occurred, and the mother had never observed any 
impropriety at all. 
The opinion does not reveal direct testimony from any 
other source that could have served to establish even suspi-
cion of intercourse. In the nature of such things, there seldom 
will be outside observers. Both mother and daughter had, 
however, told the grand jury of specific details of intercourse 
that had occurred not merely once but many times, both in 
the presence of the mother and while she was absent. The 
grand jury transcript showing this testimony might have been 
admissible under the pre-1967 law to impeach the present 
12. 257 Cal. App.2d 655, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 875 (1967), hearing in California 
18 
Supreme Court granted February 21, 
1968. 
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relatively innocent testimony of the two;13 it could have shown 
that they lied when they denied intercourse, but it could not 
have served as affirmative evidence that intercourse had oc-
curred. 
Fully recognizing this distinction, the court of appeal held 
that Evidence Code section 1235 gives substantive effect 
to the prior grand jury testimony by making it evidence that 
intercourse had occurred on the charged date. Further, the 
conviction appears to rest on these prior statements alone. 
Most of the prior statements admitted were made before 
the grand jury. As a consequence, it can be assumed that 
they were made under oath, but any cross-examination that 
might have occurred was not by the defendant himself. Under 
existing practice, the proceeding is not adversary. This has 
significance only to distinguish another and very distinct hear-
say exception, that of recorded prior testimony. In the John-
son case there had been a prior trial and conviction. Proffer 
of the sworn testimony of the two principal witnesses as 
recorded at that prior trial would be governed by quite distinct 
principles stated in great detail in section 1291. The impor-
tant difference to be noted is that the prior trial testimony is 
receivable because the defendant had an opportunity to cross-
examine at that time, which may warrant receipt against him 
of the transcript even if he has no opportunity to cross-examine 
at the present trial. He could not cross-examine before the 
grand jury, and his right to confront the daughter and wife 
may well be deemed to turn upon his present effective right 
to cross-examine them about their grand jury testimony. 
The testimony of daughter and mother might have taken 
two lines very different from what actually occurred. Suppose 
the mother testified that she had no knowledge or recollection 
of the events at all. Would her grand jury testimony then 
have been "inconsistent with" her testimony at the second 
trial? This nearly occurred in another proof item offered, 
the testimony, by another witness, that the mother had related 
13. The prosecutor having called the 
women, they were "his witnesses" under 
the old law. But if he succeeded in per-
suading the judge that he was both sur-
274 CAL LAW 1967 
prised by their change of testimony and 
damaged by what they said on the stand, 
the impeachment could be permitted. 
See Comment to Cal. Evid. Code § 785. 
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to the witness some of the same complaints about the conduct 
of the defendant. The opinion does not directly consider 
whether inconsistency can be found in memory matched 
against lack of memory, or whether it requires contradiction. 
The court said merely that "this exception to the hearsay rule 
should apply in order to fully ascertain the truth of the mat-
ter.,,14 Although hardly an explanation, the ruling seems cor-
rect. The Code speaks of inconsistency, not contradiction. 
The other and much more speCUlative line of testimony by 
mother and daughter would have been to refuse to testify 
upon grounds of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
Whether such a privilege claim would be sustained is not 
clear; the opinion does not reveal whether there was any risk 
of prosecution against them. If they had, rightly or wrongly 
but nevertheless successfully, claimed the privilege, the claim 
of lack of the constitutional right to confrontation would have 
assumed serious proportions. But the argument perhaps need 
not ascend to the constitutional level. Is a claim of privilege 
"testimony" at all within the meaning of section 1235? If 
it is not, and it seems very doubtful that refusal to testify 
can be the equivalent of testimony, there seems to be nothing 
with which the prior statement can be deemed to be incon-
sistent. This argument, then, is that the prior statement 
remains, as it always was, hearsay. Because this newly cre-
ated exception does not apply, the argument continues, the 
grand jury testimony is not admissible. 
A new hearsay exception found in the Evidence Code and 
without prior history in California is section 1300: 
Evidence of a final judgment adjudging a person guilty 
of a crime punishable as a felony is not made inadmissible 
by the hearsay rule when offered in a civil action to prove 
any fact essential to the judgment unless the judgment 
was based on a plea of nolo contendere. 
How it may work can be illustrated by two cases decided dur-
ing the year. In O'Conner v. O'Leary15 a theater patron had 
14. 257 Cal. App.2d at 664, 64 Cal. 15. 247 Cal. App.2d 646, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. at 882. Rptr. 1 (1967). For further discussion 
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been killed in an affray with O'Leary, an employee of the 
theater owner. O'Conner's heirs sued for his wrongful death, 
joining O'Leary and his employer. Prior to the trial O'Leary 
had been convicted of felony manslaughter, and plaintiffs 
offered proof of this as collateral estoppel against him under 
the doctrine of Teitelbaum v. Dominion Insurance CO.16 The 
court of appeal held exclusion to be proper; although ordi-
narily conclusive against O'Leary alone, admitting the 
conviction as to O'Leary would also bring it before the 
jury as to the employer as well, working prejudice to the 
employer's interests. And there would be no realization of 
judicial economy by avoiding trial of the issue of cause of 
death, because that issue had to be tried against the employer 
in any event. 
The decision is a careful treatment of the problem, and was 
probably the correct decision at the time it was made. The 
Code section quoted above would seem to require a different 
result today. Since the felony conviction would now be admis-
sible against the employer, he cannot be saved from the 
"prejudice" of having the jury hear about it. And there is 
no reason why the conviction would not be given its full 
collateral estoppel effect against the employee, although al-
lowed only as evidence effective against the employer. An 
explanation of this distinction is that O'Leary had prior oppor-
tunity to defend himself on the charge and failed, but that 
the employer had no such opportunity. 
The first case actually applying section 1300 did expose 
a little difficulty in judicial handling, however. People v. 
One 1964 Chevroletl7 was a proceeding to forfeit an auto-
mobile because the registered owner had entrusted it to his 
son, who had knowingly possessed and transported contra-
band narcotics in the automobile. The son was tried and 
convicted, in a jury trial, of felony possession of marijuana. 
He testified in the forfeiture proceeding that he had no knowl-
edge of the presence of the drug. The trial judge allowed 
of this case, see Weiner, Civil Proce- 17. 251 Cal. App.2d 424, 59 Cal. 
dure in this volume. Rptr. 594 (1967). 
16. 58 Ca1.2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 
375 P.2d 439 (1962). 
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receipt of the felony conviction as evidence that the son did 
know of its presence. After a verdict for defendants, the 
judge granted a new trial on several grounds, two of them 
having to do with the felony conviction. The first of these 
was that he should have ruled that the conviction was conclu-
sive on the point of knowledge. On this the trial judge was 
clearly wrong. It was evidence only against the owner, who 
had no previous opportunity to contest that point because 
he was not a party to the criminal conviction. The court of 
appeal so held. 
The second ground is closely connected; the judge also 
thought that he erred in permitting the owner's counsel to 
argue to the jury that the felony conviction was wrong because 
the jury had rendered "inconsistent verdicts," had "undeni-
ably" compromised its verdicts in acquitting on some counts 
and convicting on only one, and had violated oaths in not 
"applying the doctrine of reasonable doubt." The court of 
appeal opinion is unsatisfactory on this point. It appears to 
agree with the trial judge's self-assigned error. If the convic-
tion is only evidence, and it is no more than that under section 
1300, it is not sacrosanct evidence that cannot be questioned 
or contradicted. As with any other hearsay, it is subject 
to question on the reliability of the out-of-court declarant-
here the criminal jury. This is especially true when the issue is 
credibility. If the forfeiture jury believed the boy's denial of 
knowledge, can they be required to yield to the criminal 
jury's contrary conclusion that he lied? A holding that they 
must comes perilously close to denial of due process to the 
owner, as well as denial of a right to jury trial on a contested 
issue of fact. 
Although section 1300 of the Evidence Code has relaxed 
the former prohibition against the use in evidence of felony 
convictions, the limitation contained in the language implies 
that misdemeanor convictions must still be excluded. Rec-
ognizing this distinction, Rousseau v. West Coast House 
Movers18 rightly held that it was improper to receive evidence 
18. 256 Cal. App.2d 989, 64 Cal. 
Rptr. 655 (1967). 
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of three convictions for misdemeanor drunk driving, which 
were evidently offered to show that plaintiff had not lost his 
capacity to drive as a consequence of the injuries claimed. 
Although finding the error not prejudicial in the circum-
stances, the correct rule was stated.19 
The court did find its ruling on that point somewhat 
anomalous when compared to another hearsay decision it 
made in the same case. It approved reception of some twenty 
police arrest reports which recited the names of the arresting 
officers, the times and places of arrests, and that plaintiff 
was "drunk on sidewalk" or "unable to care for self." Some 
contained an admission to drinking beer or whiskey. 
Since the prime injury claimed was that the injury had trans-
formed a sober, reliable worker into an irrational alcoholic, 
evidence of arrests for drunkenness dating prior to the date 
of injury must have had a very telling effect. The court 
found that these records were admissible under the Business 
Records Act, which is continued substantially unchanged from 
its pre-Code form.20 The court found it "somewhat illogical" 
to admit the arrest reports while excluding the misdemeanor 
convictions. But again the ruling seems correct. The reports 
gave every appearance of being made on first-hand knowledge 
and observation of the officer making the report, and did not 
contain what is so usual in accident investigation reports-
the unchecked hearsay of unknown witnesses who have no 
duty to make honest or accurate reports. But this is only 
an assumption made from the face of the records themselves. 
If it is necessary to summon as a witness the arresting officer 
so that he can testify that the entries are his own observation 
19. Another possible distinction to be 
drawn, perhaps misleading, is that the 
section is confined to civil actions, sug-
gesting that convictions may not be re-
ceived in criminal cases. It has long 
been the rule that in those limited cir-
cumstances in which prior crimes are 
provable in a criminal case, the fact 
that the prior crime was committed may 
be proved by the judgment of convic-
tion. In People v. Griffin, 66 Cal.2d 
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459, 58 Cal. Rptr. 107, 426 P.2d 507 
(1967), the supreme court faced for the 
first time the question of what effect 
should be given to a judgment of acquit-
tal. Noting that the effect of the bur-
den of proof beyond reasonable doubt 
made the effect of acquittal less convinc-
ing, the court nevertheless held that the 
fact of acquittal was admissible, leaving 
the question of its weight to the jury. 
20. Cal. Evid. Code § 1271. 
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rather than second-hand knowledge, as some cases suggest, 
the utility of the Business Records Act is sharply restricted. 
If the arrest reports are old, the arresting officer may be 
unavailable or, more likely, without any present memory of 
the event at all. 
A final hearsay case of significance decided during the year 
was Markley v. Beagle which purported to be under the old 
law but which in fact anticipated the new Code, and the 
supreme court so declared. 1 It is unlike the other cases dis-
cussed in that the ruling was against rather than in favor of 
admissibility. Markley was injured when he went to the 
roof of a building to service an exhaust fan. Among the 
defendants he sued were the contractors who allegedly had 
removed and replaced a guardrail. In support of this claim, 
Markley offered proof that one of the employees of the con-
tractors said, long after the alleged removal and after his 
employment with them had ended, that workmen employed 
by the contractors had removed and replaced the rail. Be-
cause of the lapse of time there could be no spontaneous 
utterance, and, because the employment had ceased, the state-
ment could not have been made within the scope of authority. 
Markley was thus driven to reliance on Evidence Code section 
1224: 
When the liability . . . of a party to a civil action 
is based in whole or in part upon the liability . 
of the declarant, . . . evidence of a statement made 
by the declarant is as admissible against the party as 
it would be if offered against the declarant in an action 
involving that liability. . . . 
Substitute the words "contractor" for "party to a civil action" 
and "employee" for "declarant," and the argument seems 
compelling. 
The court in Markley agreed that the language was sus-
ceptible to an interpretation that would render the employee's 
statement admissible. Although the case could be distin-
1. Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal.2d 951, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 429 P.2d 129 (1967). 
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guished, in that the employee had not made any statement 
that disclosed that he personally had removed the railing, 
but said only that some employees of the contractor had, the 
court did not postpone decision. It held that Code of Civil 
Procedure section 1851,2 the progenitor of Evidence Code 
section 1224, did not apply to cases of this kind. Despite 
the apparent meaning, that application had not been given to 
the section during the nearly 100 years the statute had been 
in existence. Unless the statement of the employee qualifies 
as an excited utterance3 or so exposes him to prospective 
liability that it may be received as a declaration against inter-
est,4 it must meet the more stringent agency test of being a 
statement the employee was authorized to make.5 It is not 
enough that it was a statement made about acts the employee 
was authorized to do. 
Evidence Code-Presumptions 
The large attention given in this article to hearsay changes 
probably is predictive of the future as well. Most of the 
Code innovations are in the hearsay area. Another field in 
which difficulty is certain to arise, because important changes 
have been made there as well, is that of presumptions. The 
cases have not yet arrived for clarification, but one that does 
suggest the character of the problems that will be encountered 
is Albers v. Owens.6 As with some others noted here, the 
case was tried before the effective date of the Code but the 
supreme court, in reversing, ventured an observation on the 
law to be applied at retrial. The defense was contributory 
negligence. Plaintiff offered evidence that he suffered from 
retrograde amnesia, thus invoking the so-called presumption 
of due care that has played so large a role in these cases. 
The opinion says, "This presumption had been held to be evi-
2. Ca1. Stats. 1945, ch. 1292, § 2 p. that § 1224 might extend to such cases, 
2425. seems discredited by the supreme court 
3. Cal. Evid. Code § 1240. holding in Markley, which was not 
4. Cal. Evid. Code § 1230. known at the time LeMire was decided. 
S. Ca1. Evid. Code § 1222. The sug- 6. 66 Ca1.2d 790, 59 Cal. Rptr. 117, 
gestion of LeMire v. Lyman, 250 Cal. 427 P.2d 781 (1967). 
App.2d 799, 58 Cal. Rptr. 804 (1967), 
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dence in itself sufficient to forestall a nonsuit based on con-
tributory negligence."7 Since the opinion had already ruled 
that a jury issue was presented, the court merely observed that 
"on retrial it is clear that such a presumption would not have 
the effect of evidence."g The citation is to Evidence Code 
section 600 (a), which expressly so declares. 
The question not discussed is whether the so-called pre-
sumption of due care any longer exists or can have any 
operative effect. It is not listed among the presumptions 
classified as affecting the burden of producing evidence9 nor 
is it found in the list of those that affect the burden of proof.10 
The reason for omission is not oversight. Under the Code 
scheme, the maximum effect a presumption can have is to 
shift the burden of proof to the person against whom the 
presumption operates (sometimes aptly called the "victim" 
of the presumption). Since the defendant already bears the 
burden of proving contributory negligence, there is little pro-
cedural role that the presumption of due care can any longer 
play. 
This is not to say, however, that the old wisdom that was 
incorporated in the discredited presumption is also repealed. 
While an attorney can no longer argue to the jury that there 
is "evidence" of due care, he can appeal to the common sense 
of the jurors by invoking their own realization that people 
do in fact have a high incentive to look out for their own 
safety, and as such the jury can reason that plaintiff did act 
accordingly. 
Conclusion 
A critical reader may say that many of the statements 
found herein are more conjecture than projection. That is 
conceded. At the end of the first full year of experience 
under the Evidence Code, we know scarcely more about it 
7. 66 Cal.2d at 799, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 
123, 427 P.2d at 787. 
8. 66 Ca1.2d at 800, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 
124, 427 P.2d at 788. 
9. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 631-645. 
10. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 661-668. 
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than we did at the beginning. One observation can be made, 
however, that tells something about the Code's probable fu-
ture. The appellate decisions have embraced the new law with 
near enthusiasm rather than doubt and hostility. This indi-
cates willing acceptance of at least its general provisions. 
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